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By letter of 4 October 1979 the Commission of the European·communities 
forwarded to the European Parliament the court of Auditors' report on the balance 
sheet and accounts of the ECSC for the financial year 1977. 
On 5 ~ovember 1979 the President of the European Parliament referred 
this report to the Committee on Budgetary Control. 
On 20 November 1979 the committee on Budgetary Control appointed 
Mr Antoniozzi rapporteur. 
At its meeting of 17 March 1980 the committee unanimously adopted 
the motion for a resolution and the explanatory statement. 
Present: Mr Aigner, chairman; Mr Dankert, first vice-chairman; 
Mrs Boserup, second vice-chairman; Mr Price, third vice-chairman; Mr Antoniozzi, 
rapporteur; Mr Battersby, Mr Colla, Mr Gabert, Mr Gouthier, Mr Kellett-Bowman, 
Mr Key, Mr Irmer, Mr Langes, Mr Notenboom and Mr Simonnet. 
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A 
The Committee on Budgetary Control hereby submits to the European Parliament 
the following draft decision and motion for a resolution, together with explanatory 
statement: 
DRAFT DECISION 
on the dischnrge to be given to the Commission of the European communities 
in respect of the ECSC's financial and budgetary activities for the financial 
year 1977 
and 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on the report of the court of Auditors on the ECSC's financial and budgetary 
activities for the financial year 1977 and on the discharge in respect of 
that financial year 
The European Parliament, 
- having regcrd to the Court of Auditors' report on the balance sheet and 
accounts 0£ the ECSC for the financial year 197~ 
- having regard to the accounts and final balance sheet for that financial 
year, 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control 
(Doc. 1-64/80), 
A, With regard to the general aspects of the audit 
1. Notes th~t the Treaty establishing the European Coal and 
Steel Community gives the High Authority substantial powers 
of control in the territories of the Member States; 
2. Points out that the external audit carried out by the Court 
of Auditors cannot be complete unless it includes the 
administration of the ECSC; 
3. Emphasizes that, with regard to financial activities, the 
Treaty of 22 July 1975 establishing the Court of Auditors 
did not take account of the distinctive operational structure 
of the ECSC's as compared with that of the other Communities; 
4. Notes that this lack of coordination between the Treaties makes 
it difficult to define the powers of the Court of Auditors and 
prevents it from exercising adequate control in the form of 
indepen:Jenton-the-spot checks; 
Points out, however, that in accordance with the general budget-
ary rules and with the practice applied to the other institutions, 
the court of Auditors certifies as correct the ECSC balance sheet 
and acco~nts submitted by the High Authority; 
6. Confirms that it is absolutely essential for the European 
Parliament to be given precise information on the ECSC's activi-
ties in order both to assess the soundness of the financial 
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management an,l to form a political appraisal of the implemen-
tation of the ECSC budget as a whole; 
7. Reaffirms, moreover, that; 
(a) the external audit by the Court of Auditors enables 
the management of a Community which enJoys financial 
autonomy to be adequately assessed; 
(b) this audit should be carried out on a regular and perma-
nent basis and should relate to all areas of the ECSC's 
activities; 
8. Points out, therefore, that for this purpose the Treaty 
establishing the ECSC should be revised with the final 
purpose of clarifying the duties and powers of control of the 
court of Auditors and establishing firmly the European Parlia-
ment's right to grant a discharge to the High Authority in 
~espect of its management of the ECSC; 
9. Requests that, pending the revision of the Treaty, an agreement 
should be reached between the European Parliament, the Court of 
Auditors and the High Authority/Commission on the Court's 
role and powers, above all with regard to the po~sibility of 
carrying out on-the-spot inspections; 
10. Points out that this is feasible virtue of the fact that the 
High Authority wields both the legislative and executive powers 
of the ECSC and can take decisions relating to the verification 
of its activities and management, without interference by the 
Council; 
B. With_~egard_to_the_ErinciEal_statistics_ relating to the ES,_SC's 
activities_for_the_financial_year_l977 
11. Notes that: 
(a) the assets comprise the following: 
Loans out of borrowed funds 
Other loans 
Cash and bank accounts 
Other investments, real estate and portfolio 
issuing costs 
miscellaneous 
accrued income 
Total 
- 6 -
(' OOO EUA) 
3,912,529 
142,665 
307,698 
163,493 
62,612 
156,727 
101,514 
4 , 847,238 
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(b) the liabilities comprise the following: 
Borrowings and redemption premiums 
Reserves 
Provisions 
Former Pension Fund 
Miscellaneous coupons and creditors 
Interest and commission on loans and 
guarantees 
Undistributed balance 
Total 
('OOO EUA) 
3,955,903 
317,500 
258,529 
39,916 
146,355 
128,950 
85 
4,847,238 
(c) ECSC revenue and expenditure from 1 January 1977 to 31 December 1977 
were as follows: 
REVENUE 
- Servicing of lending operations and guarantees 
- Levy 
- Interest to deposits and portfolio 
- ~djustments - currency parities 
Total 
EXPENDITURE 
- Servicing of borrowing operations and guarantees 
- ~dministrative expenditure 
- Expenditure for research 
- Expenditure for rehabilitation 
- Assistance to coking coal 
( I OOO EUA) 
328,604 
86, 840 
30,475 
43 
312,228 
17,721 
34,666 
30,752 
- Interest rebates for investments and reorganization 
5,275 
6,963 
84 
38,264 
- Other expenditure 
- Excess of income over expenditure 
'I'ota 1 
c. With_re9ard_to_the_comrnents_of_the_Court_of_Auditors 
~~~L~§J 
12. Regrets that: 
(a) the audit of the levies carried out by the High Authority 
was inadequate and has given rise to doubts about the 
volume of contributions and the accuracy of the statements 
made; 
(b) the internal of the rehabilitation sector was substantially 
confined to book-keeping matters; 
(c) with regard to industrial loans and loans for reorganization, 
no 30lution has been found to the crucial question of defining 
objectives in the light of the worsening steel crisis; 
(d) as regards social housing, there is no systematic audit 
involving the drafting of reports; 
13. Agrees with the Court of Auditors on the need to prepare specific 
information on the general objectives to be pursued in the manage-
ment of the coal and iron and steel policies; 
14. Considers such information essential in order to assess whether 
the financial management is conducted by the High Authority in a 
proper manner; 
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DECISION ON THE DISCHARGE 
D. In_the_lisht_of_the_foresoins 
15. Requests the High Authority and the Court of Auditors to submit 
their comments on the possibility of reorganizing the ECSC's accoun-
ting system to make it more efficient and to facilitate effective 
control, perhaps by computer centralization of the statistics for 
individual sectors and branches of activity; 
16. Instructs the High Authority/Commission to submit as soon as possible, and 
in any event within the deadlines set for discussion of the report 
for the financial year 1978, a comprehensive report on its concept 
of control and how it could be exercised; 
17. Grants a discharge to the High Authority in respect of the 
financial management of the ECSC for the financial year 1977 
but requests it to take steps to prevent the recurrence of the 
deficiencies criticized by the Court of Auditors; 
18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the 
relevant report to the Commission of the European Communities. 
8 PE 62. 904/fin. 
B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
Introduction 
1. The fjnancial structure of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), which was set up by the Treaty of Paris of 18 April 1951, has points of 
similarity with both the public sector, by virtue of its fiscal P?Wers (levy 
on coal and steel production), and the private sector, by virtue of its 
ability to raise funds on the capital market as a means of supplementing 
its revenue and diversifying its activities. 
2. As rightly pointed out in the report of the Auditor on the financial 
year 1976, 'the Paris Treaty did not endow the ECSC with a traditional 
budgetary structure except in respect of its administrative budget which, 
since the werger of the Executives, forms part of the single budget of 
the Commission of the European Comm~nities• 1 • Whereas variable resources 
and specific expenditure estimates are contained in an operational budget, 
which is meant to be used to fix the rate of the levy, borrowing and lending 
operations and the management of funds are never the subject of a budget 
estimate because of their strictly financial nature. 
3. This situation was not altered by the merger of the Executives in 
1967. Administrative expenditure is charged as a fixed annual contribution 
to the Commission budget, and the Commission has continued to manage 
the ECSC's assets completely separately from the general budget. Apart 
from the restrictions outlined below, the ECSC has therefore retained 
its original distinctive features though a new institutional framework. 
4. This distinctiveness is highlighted by the fact that the Treaty 
vested both legislative and executive powers in the High Authority, so 
that it is impossible, as pointed out by the Auditor in the 1976 report, 
'to separate the budgetary authority from the administrative executive 
or to establish real financial rules• 2 . 
1 Doc. 220/77, p.102 
2 Doc. 220/77, p.141 
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5. The ECSC's activities can be divided into two major sectors, the 
first of which, the borrowing and lending service, is administered in 
accordance with normal banking practice, while the second, the granting 
of financial aids, is dealt with by the administrative departments of the 
High Authority and comes under the operational budget already referred to 
under point 2. A decision of 2 August 1976 relating exclusively to this 
budget, codified and supplemented previous practices in the form of the 
'Internal rules for the drawing up and implementation of the operational 
budget of the ECSC'. While maintaining the ECSC's financial autonomy, 
these rules 'have taken over the essentials of the general budgetary 
principles of the financial rules which govern the administrative budget•: 
6. With regard to relations between the High Authority and the other 
institutions, it should be pointed out that, since it wields both legislative 
and executive powers, the High Authority is, de jure and de facto and not 
bound by decisions taken by the Council of Ministers. This is not true of 
' its relations with Parliament, since Article 24 of the ECSC Treaty gives 
the Assembly the right to censure the High Authority and requires the latter 
to forward to Porliament a 'general report' on its activities. The ECSC 
Treaty does not, however, accord Parliament the powers referred to in 
Article 206b of the EEC Treaty, which states 'The Assembly, acting on a 
recommendation from the Council which shall act by a qualified majority, 
shall give .a discharge to the Commission in respect of the implementation 
of the budget'. Article 78g of the ECSC Treaty limits such powers to the 
implement~tion of the 'administrative budget'. This is one example of the 
lack of coordination, to which this report will return, between the various 
texts governing the activities of the European Communities and it illustrates 
the urgent need to define more closely the institutional powers cf the 
Community bodies. 
The Court of Auditors was set up by the Treaty of 22 April 1975 and 
is responsible for exercising external control, the nature of which will be 
discussed in greater detail below. 
1 Doc. 220/77, p.141 
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However, it might be useful to point out that in its resolution of 
11 July 1975, the European Parliament, which receives the Court's annual 
report from the High Authority, defined the scope of the control as follows: 
'External control by the Auditor should go beyond the purely 
accounting aspect of the subject matter involved, and should 
be strengthened in its capacity and ability to obtain all 
necessary information for providing Parliament with a complete 
assessment of the financial rranagement and the ~esults 
achieved' 1 . 
7. The external audit of the ECSC' s activi.t:i.es was carried out by the 
Auditor during the period up to the end of e1~ 1976 financial year. 
The Auditor was appointed by the Council on 8 December 1973 and, und~r 
Article 78 of the Treaty, was responsible for. submitting an annual report, 
within six months of the end of the finar.cial year to which the accounts 
referred, on the proper conduct of the accounting operations and the 
financial management of various institutions. This is thB first time since 
its creation that the Court of Auditors has ~eported on the ECSC's activities 
and it provides a further opportunity to reconsider the nature of the audit 
and the role of the bodies which carry it out. 
control over the ECSC's activities: the Hiqh Authority's powers 
8. The ECSC's activities to an increasing extent involve a substantial 
financial commitment based on contracts which relate to different sectors 
of activity and therefore cannot be governed by one set of rules. 
9. As will be shown more clearly in the following paragraph, this 
situation has a decisive influence on the external control carried out 
by the court of Auditors and it is therefore appropriate to emphasize t~e 
considerable powers of verification vested by the ECSC Treaty in the 
High Aurthority/Commission. 
Article 86, fourth subparagraph states: 
'Offici~ls of the High Authority entrusted by it with tasks of 
inspection shall enjoy in the territories of the Member States, 
to the full extent required for the performance of their duties, 
such rights and powers as are granted by the laws of these States 
to their own revenue officials'. 
This position illustrates the fact that the ECSC Treaty is more supranational 
in character than the other Community Treaties and gives the Commission, in its 
role as High Authority, a right of initiative and enq:.iiry normally denied to 
it. and confirmed by the fact that it enjoys 'such rights and powers' as are 
granted to national revenue officials. 
1 OJ No. C 179, 6.8.1975, p. 73 
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10. Moreover, to understand more fully the High Authority's powers, it 
should be pointed out that it has the right to impose sanctions against the 
Member States (Article 88/ECSc) for failure to fulfil obligations under 
the Treaty or against undertakings, as stated in Article 91: 
'If an undertaking does not pay by the time limit set a sum which 
it is liable to pay to the High Authority( .•. ), the High Authority 
may suspend payment of sums which it is liable to pay to that under-
ta<.in;J, up to the amount of the outstanding payment'. 
Enforcement of decisions in the territory of the Member States is carried 
out by means of the legal procedure in force in each State and may be 
suspended only by a decision by the Court of Justice (Article 92/ECSC). 
control over the ECSC's activities: role of the court of Auditors 
11. In discussing the external control carried out by the Court of Auditors, 
a distinctioi1 should be drawn between the ECSC's administration and its 
financial activities, since, as will be shown below, the Court does not 
exercise the same powers in the two sectors or indeed in the other 
Communities. 
12. The legal basis for assessing the Court's powers in relation to 
administration is provided by Article 78f/ECSC which states in paragraph 1: 
'The Co~rt of Auditors shall examine the accounts of all 
administrative expenditure and administrative revenue of 
the Community ( ... )' 
and in paragraph 2: 
'The court of Auditors shall examine whether all revenue 
referred to in paragraph 1 has been received and all 
expenditure referred to in that paragraph has been incurred 
in a lawful and regular manner and whether the financial 
management has been sound'. 
The Treaty therefore grants the Court considerable powers of control over 
the ECSC's administration. 
13. The situation is somewhat different with regard to financial activities, 
which, moreover, ~epresent the most important source of ECSC revenue, with 
loans now being granted at the rate of 1,000 million EUA each year. The 
Treaty does not contain specific provisions governing external control in 
this sector, since the Treaty of 22 July 1975 establishing the Court of 
Auditors did not take account of the ECSC•s distinctive operational structure 
compared witr, that of the other Communities. This raises an initial legal 
difficulty for the Court, since it cannot make use of written documents to 
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carry out the task of verification that as an institution it is required 
to fulfil. 
14. A further difficulty derives from the fact that the Court is not 
legally entitled to carry out independent on-the-spot inspection visits, 
since Article 78f(3), of the Treaty states 'The audit shall be based on 
records, and, if necessary, performed on the spot in the institutions of 
the Community and in the Member States. In the Member States the audit 
sh~ll be carried out in liaison with the national audit bodies or, if 
these do not have the necessary powers, with the competent national 
departments. As shown in the previous section, these restrictions do not 
apply to the High Authority/Commission which, under Article 86, has 
considerable powers with regard to on-the-spot visits. 
15. Unlike the ECSC Treaty, the EEC Treaty does not restrict the powers 
of the Court of Auditors to 'administrative expenditure and administrative 
revenue'. Article 206a/EEC states that the Court of Auditors 'shall examine 
the accounts of all revenue and expenditure of the Community', whether or 
not it is classified as operational. This reinforces the comment made under 
point 11 to the effect that the Court's powers are not the same for all the 
Communities. 
16. One suecific case should be mentioned in connection with the half-yearly 
verification by the court of Auditors of the ECSC balance sheet and accounts 
submitted by the High Authority/Commission. This is not based directly on the 
provisions of the Treaty but is connected with the fact that in order to 
raise loans, in particular on the American market, the Commission needs to 
provide balance sheets which have been certified as correct. By agreement 
between the parties concerned this task, which is normally carried out by 
private law trust companies, was for some time entrusted to the Community 
Auditor and has been carried out since its inception by the Court of 
Auditors. A number of differences of opinion arose between the Court of 
Auditors and the Commission with regard to certification of the 1977 balance 
sheet. The Court requested that the document originally submitted be 
corrected, which delayed the signing of the document until 1 November 1979. 
Both the Commission and the Court could be asked to provide further 
information on this matter. 
The need to amend the Treaty 
17. This tends to confirm the fact that the powers of control are wielded 
principally by the High Authority alone, which does. not depend on any other 
institution for the implementation of its decisions. 
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18. This would seem to run counter not only to Article 78g/ECSC, under 
which the Assembly may, on a recommendation from the Council, give a 
discharge to the High Authority in respect of the implementation of the 
administrative budget, but in particular to Article 24, which is common 
I 
to all the Treaties establishing the European Communities and which entitles 
the Assembly to pass a motion of censure on the activities of the High 
Authority. 
19. Unless it is in a position to verify whether the ECSC has been 
managed in a regular manner, under no circumstances can the Assembly 
exercise its powers to the full, including those relating to the ECSC's 
financial activities, which as has already been seen, are not subject to 
any external control. In view also of the fact that Article 7Bf(4) provides 
that the court of Auditors 'shall assist the Assembly and the Council in 
exercising th~ir powers of control over the implementation of the budget', 
it would appear essential to clarify the position of the Court of 
Auditors, if necessary through a revision of the Treaty. The Treaty 
shollld explicitly refer to the Court's powers in relation both to the 
verification of financial activities and to the possibility of carrying 
out on-the~spot inspections. 
20. The above 'difficulties relating to external control by the Court of 
Auditors of the ECSC's financial activities and the need to clarify the 
court's position also apply to the European Investment Bank, whose 
financial activities are not subject to any form of control. While this 
is not the place to consider in depth whether this institution, which is 
of vital importance for the implementation of Community policies, should 
also be the subject of an investigation and verification procedure, it is 
important to establish whether Parliament has the political will to tackle 
this problem. 
The Court of Auditors' report on the financial activities of the ECSC for 
financial year 1977 
21. In view of the restrictions outlined above, the scope of the Court:• s 
report on the ECSC's financial activities in 1977 is necessarily limited 
and, as pointed out by a Member of the Court at a meeting of the Committee 
on Budgetary Control, does not cover the question of so~nd financial 
management, al though this is the most important aspect o·f external control. 
22. The following paragraphs are intended as a commentary on the various 
sections of the report. 
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Balance sheet and financing of the ECSC's activities 
Assets 
------
23. In 1977 the High Authority/Commission exercised the financial 
activities assigned to it by Articles 49, 54 and 56 of the ECSC Treaty. 
At the end of the financial year current loans out of borrowed funds and 
own resources totalled 4,055,192,910 EUA, an increase of 624,028,418 EUA 
(15.3%) over the previous year. 
24. The following table shows the breakdown by country and sector of 
loans granted out of borrowed funds, which represent by far the most 
important area of the ECSC's financial activities (3,912,527,167 EUA) 
in EUA 
Country Industrial Social Reorganization Total 
investment housing (Art.56) 
(Art.54) 
Belgium 149,314,219 10,012,142 32,806,070 192,132,431 
Denmark 31,127,856 31,127,856 
Germany 999,854,706 6, 769, 043 70,720, 699 1,077,344,448 
France 701,019,476 412,828 97, 741, 991 799,174,295 
Italy 576,418,350 3,785,624 497, 935 580, 701, 909 
Luxembourg 2, 729, 030 1,022,189 36,858,156 40,609,375 
Netherlands , 89, 391, 307 1,196,681 18,983,997 109,571,985 
Ulited Kingdom 1,014, 341, 716 67,523,152 1,081,864,868 
Total 3,564, 196, 660 23,198,507 325,132, OOO 3, 912,527,167 
To complete the picture it should be pointed out that loans for the 
financing of industrial investment projects (Article 54) were broken 
down as follows: 
('OOO EUA) 
- Icon and steel industry 2,674,359 
- Coal and coke 752,033 
- Iron-ore mines 72,622 
- Thermal power stations 62,484 
- Shipbuilding 2,695 
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25. Other loans, granted out of the Special Reserve for financing social 
housing, out of levy funds for rehabilitation and technical research and 
out of the former Pension Fund for the purchase of housing by EEC officials, 
totalled 142,665,743 EUA. 
26. Taking account of the above and of the other sections of the balance 
sheet, the assets comprise the following: 
- Loans out of borrowed funds 
- Other loans 
- Cash and bank accounts 
- Other investments, real estate and portfolio 
- Issuing costs 
- Miscellaneous 
- Accrued income 
Total 
Liabilities 
( I OOO EUA) 
3,912,529 
142,665 
307,698 
163,493 
62, 612 
156,727 
101, 514 
4,847,238 
27. During the financial year in question the ECSC contracted 31 loans in 
various currencies totalling 727,378,908 EUA. As a result of these 
transactions, total borrowings at 31 December 1977 amounted to 3,954,000 
million EUA as compared with 3,475,000 million EUA at the end of 1976. 
Loans contracted in USA$ accounted for 43.3%. 
28. Of the other items under liabilities, reserves and provisions are of 
particular importance. Reserves (Guarantee Fund and Special Reserve) 
totalled 317,500,000 EUA in 1977, an increase of 35.5 million EUA over the 
previous year. Provisions, which totalled 258,529,273 EUA, are intended to 
provide fir..ance, for rehabilitation, research, interest rebates and aids. 
29. Taking account of the other items in the balance sheet, the liabilities 
a,mprise the following: 
- Borrowings and redemption premiums 
- Provisions 
- Former Pension Fund 
- Miscellaneous coupons and creditors 
- Interest and commission on loans and guarantees 
- Undistributed balance 
Total 
- 16 -
( I OOO EUA) 
3,955,903 
317,500 
258,529 
39,916 
146,355 
128,950 
85 
4,847,238 
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Management account and ECSC levy 
30. One of the chapters in the Court of Auditors' comments and 
observations on the financial activities of the ECSC for the financial 
year 1977 contains an analysis of ECSC revenue and expenditure (management 
account). 
31. The most important comments concern the income from the levy on coal 
and iron and steel production, not so much because it represents a sub-
stantial item of revenue (86,840 million EUA in 1977), but because of the 
originality of the principle on which it is based. Article 49 of the ECSC 
Treaty states that 'the High Authority is empowered to procure the funds 
it requires to carry out its tasks: 
- by imposing levies on the production of coal and steel: 
- by contracting loans'. 
The borrowing and lending activities have already been discussed in 
connection with the community budget. The levy is based on the powers 
vested in the High Authority by Article 49 of the ECSC Treaty, which has 
no equivalent in any other Community Treaty. 
32. The ECSC uses the income from the levy to finance the activities 
provided for in the operational budget (as distinct from the investment 
budget, which relates to borrowing and lending) and listed in Article 50 
of the Treaty, in particular: 
- Administrative expenses 17.7 million in 1977 
Aid for rehabilitation 30.7 
Aid for research 34.6 II 
- Interest rebates for investments 
and industrial reorganization 7~0 
Aid for coking coal 5.3 II 
33. As a result of the crisis in the coal and iron and steel industries, 
which means that undertakings cannot be expected to pay higher costs, since 
1972 the rate of the levy has remained at 0.29%1 of the average value per 
tonne of the different types of chargeable product.· 
1 For 1977, see High Authority Decision No. 3115/76/ECSC of 20 December 1976. 
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Since it is impossible to increase the resources which determine the level 
of financing from the ECSC's operational budget, the latter is in effect 
obsolescent, a point which has frequently prompted comments and proposals 
from both the commission and the European Parliament: 
34. Hence the levy no longer represents the most important source of ECSC 
revenue. As shown above, the ECSC bases almost all its own financial 
projects on the investment budget and is to an increasing extent fulfilling 
the role of a bank or private undertaking rather than a genuine international 
2 organization, whose objectives are explicitly laid down in the relevant Treaty. 
The audit 
35. An important part of the Court of auditors' report on the ECSC's financial 
activities is devoted to its comments on the documents forwarded by the High 
Authority/Commission. As already explained earlier, the Court of Auditors 
does not consider itself competent to carry out on-the-spot checks; the 
points made below therefore refer to internal audits carried out by the 
appropriate departments of the High Authority. The Court's role therefore 
consisted in taking over and consolidating existing documents and studies 
and, where appropriate, in providing its own version of the facts. 
36. To provide the Committee on Budgetary Control with systematic 
information on the Court's comments, the following paragraphs outline some 
of the more important criticisms, relating them where possible to the 
replies forwarded by the High Authority to the committee secretariat and 
annexed to this report. 
The levy 
37. The Co:Jrt considered the procedures for ensuring full collection of the 
levy. It e,uerged that: 
- there is doubt as to whether all the collieries and steelworks have been 
assessed (the report refers in particular to British industries); 
- there is a considerable difference between the production of hard coal 
declared for levy and the figures provided by the Statistical Office; 
- more audits should be carried out to eliminate abuses resulting mainly 
from a lack of information in the undertakings about which products are 
subject to the levy; 
it is essential to carry out a genuinely systematic enquiry into under-
takings liable to pay the levy and into the accuracy of their statements. 
1 In this connection see inter alia: Report by Mr Cointat on the inter-
institutional dialogue on certain budgetary questions (Doc. 150/78, p.83ff) 
2 In the management account, the Service of borrowing and guarantees, showed 
revenue of 326,592,113 EUA and expenditure of 312,228,992 EUA 
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38. In its reply the High Authority points out that the levy is not imposed 
below the minimum of 100 EUA per month and per undertaking and undertakings 
are normally assessed by their trade associations. It attributes the lack of 
adequate audits to insufficient resources in its inspectorate. 
Rehabilitation 
39. The Court states that claims for refunds sent to the Commissi-_,n are 
supported by computer-produced statements, whose basic data were sometimes 
found to be inaccurate. In general, the Commission is criticized for 
carrying out too few audits and confining itself to book-keeping matters, 
whereas it should be investigating the social impact of the aid and the 
results of the rehabilitation (re-employment of workers, etc). The Court 
also claims that the Commission does not adequately verify that the 
conditions of eligibility for assistance are met, and it specifically mentions 
the inadequate information obtained from sampling. 
40. The Commission emphasizes that the computer-based system has been well 
tried and tested and that the few errors which occur are usually book-keeping 
errors. It repeats that the staff assigned to audits is inadequate, (three 
officials for all the Member States), and emphasizes that preventive audits, 
which are prograrruned onto computer, already provide a full picture of the 
situation and do not need to be increased in number. With regard to the 
suggestion by the Court that a survey should be carried out into the 
efficiency and effectiveness of aid policy, the High Authority points out 
that this forms part of the rehabilitation policy which it establishes in 
consultation with the Member States. Moreover, since around 50,000 workers 
receive assistance each year, it would not be feasible to investigate the 
results of rehabilitation. This raises the question, however, as to how 
the High Authority can formulate policies without having some idea, even 
based only on samp1es, of the success of the projects it finances. 
41. Finally, the High Authority/Commission claims that it ha~ always urged 
the Member States to submit their accounts more promptly to reduce the delays 
in payments, and it welcomes the Court's proposal that the presentation of the 
audit reports should be standardized. 
Technical and social research 
42. The Court makes a number of criticisms based on examination of the 
contracts and riders submitted by the Commission. 
43. It points out that there are still excessive time-lags between the 
relevant decision and the signing of the contract, which normally takes 
place after the date on which the work is to begin. 
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The High Authority considers it virtually impossible to:reduce the period 
of six to eight months between the decision and the contract. However, it 
points out that in order not to delay the commencement of the research work, 
since 1967 the expenditure used to calculate the ECSC contribution is that 
incurred by the recipient from the date of the decision to forward the 
proposal for aid to the Consultative Committee and to the Council for their 
opinions. 
44. The Court of Auditors also points out that: 
(a) research contracts rarely contain a quantative statement of the work; 
(b) the operations for closing the accounts have shown a definite effort 
to speed up the work and the production of files. 
(c) the method for assessing the value of residual equipment should be 
improved, since it frequently seems to be carried out without any 
real basis. In support of this the Court states that in one case 
the representative of the Directorate-General for Budgets was not 
accompanied at the final on-the-spot inspection by a representative 
of the tec>hnical Directorate-General and was th~re:f;ore not in the 
best position to assess the residual value; 
(d) a clear explanation should always be given where the original 
estimates are exceeded; 
(e) in several cases there were delays in the inplementation of the 
research project without any satisfactory explanation being given 
on the file: 
(f) the Commission should monitor more closely the rate at which the 
funds are used, since the receipt of a large sum in interest 
indicates delays in the work as compared with the programme set out 
in the contracts; 
(g) the interim inspection carried out during the contract should not 
replace the final inspection. 
45. In its reply to these comments the Commission emphasizes that the 
resj :iual v,, l:.ie of eg_uipment cannot be calculated on the basis of a linear 
amount but must be regarded as the current value in use to the purchaser, 
and that the straightforward application of a fixed rate of depreciation is 
possible only in very few cases. 
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Other comments concern the final audits, which the Commission says al 
always cover both the financial and the technical aspects and the fact that 
the actual cost of the project is frequently much higher than the original 
estimates, and that the expected duration of the project is sometimes exceeded. 
The commission claism that this is due in particular to the fact that 'a 
research project is not at all like the awarding of a public contract'. 
46. Decisions were taken on 32 loans granted by the Commission under 
Article 54 of the ECSC Treaty (industrial loans for the 'financing of 
works and installations which contribute directly and primarly to 
increasing production, reducing production costs or facilitating the 
marketing of products'), involving a total of 884.89 m EUA with an average 
Community contribution of 33.4%. 
There were nine decisions on loans granted under Article 56 (loans 
for indut.rial reorganization), involving total ECSC assistance of 119.76 
million with an average contribution of 16.6%. 
47. In this connection the court of Auditors points out: 
- with regard to decisions under Article 54 
that although the documents forwarded to the Court are reasonably complete, 
they show no evidence of cohereqt coal and steel policies, since separate 
decisions are taken for each individual undertaking. The most important 
criteria is the future of the undertaking in the face of the structural 
crises in the ECSC industries. 
- with regard to decisions under Article 56 
that they, unlike decisions under Article 54, place the projects in 
question in a wider context but provide less comprehensive information 
about the financial structure of the companies carrying out the investments. 
48. In reply t.o these comments, the High Authority/commission states that 
with regard to investments under Article 54, the compliance of the loans 
with iron and steel policy is verified as soon as the project is examined. 
Only in the event of a favourable opinion is it possible to grant a rebate. 
Where no opinion is given, this means that the project is not contrary to 
the general objectives and may be eligible for an ordinary loan. 
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Social housing 
49. From its inception the ECSC has helped to finance eight standard 
programmes for the construction of social housing and three experimental 
programmes designed to solve the problem of housing for workers in the coal 
and iron and steel industries. 
The standard programmes are financed by loans from the Special Reserve 
(73%) and from borrowed funds (28%) and the special programmes from technical 
research grants and loans. 
50. In 1977 loans totalling 12,036,141 EUA were made, broken down by Member 
State as follows: 
% 
Germany 48.6 
France 7.3 
Italy 22.3 
Luxembourg 4.7 
Belgium 7.2 
Netherlands 4.2 
Ireland 1.5 
Denmark 4.2 
100.0 
51. Of the 151,644 dwellings financed by the Community up to 31 December 1977, 
144,348 had been completed. 
52. The Court points out that the Commission follows the work of the 
regional loan committees and, although not on a regular basis, takes part 
in on-the-spot checks, and it expresses interest in receiving the reports 
on both these activities. 
The commission/High Authority does not comment on this matter. 
General points 
53. In its general conclusions the Court of Auditors notes inter alia that: 
- with regard to the levies, the inspections carried out by the Commission 
are insufficient and give rise to doubts about both the volume of the 
payments and the accuracy of the statements. It .also feels that the 
inspection should be combined with inspections relating to prices and 
investments; 
- the internal audit relating to rehabilitation is essentially concerned 
with book-keeping, whereas to assess the efficiency of this policy it 
should be carried out on the spot at the undertakings which receive 
assistance; 
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- the external audit of research activities should include an assessment 
of achievements in the light of the objectives of the coal and steel 
policies. To do so it must have access to the technical files held by 
the Authorizing Officers; 
- the main problem relating to industrial loans and loans for industrial 
structural reorganization is that of defining objectives, above all in 
view of the worsening of the steel crisis; 
with regard to social housing there is no systematic audit giving rise to 
reports which might enable the Courtb verify that the projects submitted 
by national institutes comply with the Community's objectives and programmes~ 
In more general terms it states that: 
- the gaps in the internal audit lead to difficulties in defining priority 
policy objectives, particularly at a time of extreme economic uncertainty. 
The Court of Auditors therefore needs a large-scale programme of work 
involving the collection of the most important information and the setting 
up of a consistent system of on-the-spot audits. 
Comments of the Committee on Budgetary Control 
54. The committee's comments concern two aspects. 
55. With _regard firstly to the institutional aspects of the audit, the 
committee cannot accept that the limits imposed on the Court of Auditor's 
activities are justified either by the distinctive nature of the ECSC's 
financial structure,or by the lack of relevant provisions in the Treaty. 
An incomplete audit means that Parliament's information is incomplete. 
Parliament must be in a position to carry out the task of political 
assessment assigned to it by the Treaties which as has been seen, must 
include a redefinition of the relationships and responsibilities on which 
the Community is based. 
A revision of the ECSC Treaty was therefore proposed under point 19 
to introduce provisions relating both to the Court's powers, with regard 
to the verification of financial activities and the possibility of carrying 
out on-the-spot inspections, and to Parliament's right to deliver an opinion 
on the implementation of the whole ECSC budget. (Discharge decision). 
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56. The Committee on Budgetary Control is fully aware that a revision of 
th:! Treaty involves a lengthy preliminary procedure and that it would 
delay the solution of problems which it considers urgent. It therefore 
proposes that at least some of the more important matters, relating in 
particular to the Court's role and auditing powers, should be settled 
immediately in a 'gentleman's agreement' between the European Parliament, 
the Court of Auditors and the High Authority. This is a feasible solution 
since the High Authority/Commission wields all legislative and executive 
powers and can t!1erefore take decisions relating to the verification of 
its own activities and management without interference by the Council. 
It is important to find a solution which will meet immediate require-
ments and can be adopted as an initial experiment on which to base the 
revision of the Treaty. 
57. Another matter of equal importance in institutional terms is the 
application of Article 78f(2) of the ECSC Treaty concerning sound financial 
management which the Court of Auditors did not verify in 1977 in view of 
the limits imposed on it by the Treaty. The first task is to establish 
which aspects these specific but as yet undefined terms were intended to 
cover. 
The Committee on Budgetary Control considers that in examining whether 
the ECSC has been soundly managed it is essential to undertake a comprehensive 
analysis of its activities going beyond a mere verification of the book-
keeping aspects to include a systematic assessment of the whole financial 
structure. This calls for a comparison between the general social and 
economic objectives fixed by the High Authority, the instruments used to 
achieve them and the results obtained. Without this type of control, 
financial management tends to consist merely of a series of ad hoe measures, 
deprived of any overall context and hence difficult for the European 
Parliament to assess. 
Operational and auditing aspects 
58. One of the specific criticisms made by the court in its report on 
the ECSC's financial activities in the 1977 financial year concerns the 
lack of information on general objectives. This comment, already referred 
to above in connection with the assessment of sound financial management, is 
also of relevance in a more practical context. In particular, the documents 
relating to decisions under Article 54/ECSC for loans to finance 'works 
and installations which contribute directly and primarily to increasing the 
production, reducing the production costs or facilitating the marketing of products', 
do not in the Court's view provide a basis for defining properly structured coal 
and steel policies which would clearly link general or operational objectives 
and practical measures. The High Authority/Commission should therefore be 
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urged to submit a full account of the objectives it intends to pursue and 
it must demonstrate that projects eligible for aid are compatible with 
established guidelines. 
59. There is also the question of the organization of the accounting 
system which should be efficient and should facilitate effective control. 
For this purpose, and to ensure that the checks are carried out promptly 
the Committee on Budgetary Control considers that the information should 
be centralized on a computer according to sector or branch of activity~ 
The committee points out that a balance sheet is in any event the 
economic and political reflection of the accounting system on which 
it is based and awaits the High Authority's comments on the matter. 
60. With regard to the auditing aspects, the general conclusions contained 
in the Court's report and summarized on page 19 of this ~ocument, suggest 
that the internal audit carried out by the High Authority was unsystematic 
and was confined largely to the book-keeping aspects. This is clearly 
shown by the fact that the High Authority was unable to provide detailed 
information on the controls relating to the income from the levy. The 
committee considers it unacceptable, firstly, that the Commission failed 
to assess all collieries and steel works and that there is still a con-
siderable difference between production declared for levy and the figures 
collected by the Statistical Office, and secondly, that verification of 
the use of fUnds is not carried out in accordance with a rational and pre-
established plaq of inquiry. 
Since the Court of Auditors pointed out that the internal audit 
relating to rehabilitation concentrated on the book-keeping aspects, that 
it was difficqlt to keep track of the implementation of decisions relating 
to industrial loans and loans for industrial reorganization and that, with 
regard to social housing, there was no systematic audit followed up by 
reports, Pacliament should instruct the High Authority to submit as soon as 
possible, and in any event with in the deadlines for discussion of the 
report on the 1~78 financial year, a comprehensive report on its concept of 
control and how it could be exercised. 
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COMMmfl'S BY T'rlE COMKtsSION OF THE WROPEAN CC1'(MU?U.TIES 
ON TlfE COUR'l1 OF AUIJITO!!S' R~RT 
ON THE FINANCIAL ACTIVI 'I'IES OF THE msc 
FOR THE 1''INANCIAL YEAR 1977 
.......-.--------------·-----------
:!JIE LEVY (pages 29 to .B) 
1.4 1 Para )... A de·tail ed lht of emaJ 1 B.-~i tioh mines and steel works 
is cu.rren.tly being d!·a,,m 11p., It win .nevertheless be remembered that 
th{: lovy ia not imposed bt~lcw Hie 1.n1niwum vt' 100 ElJA per month and 
Para 5. The cliff'erence is mainly due to the factors mentioned in 
the remarks column of the table and not to adjustments due to quoting 
pToductiou in tee for statistical purposes. 
1.5 More frequent controls are certainly neoeea&?7. The 
probleta ia that the resources of the inspectorate were alrea.d;r stretched 
befcre being largely diverted to the control measures involved in the 
Davignon plan. 
The company audits are uwa.11:, ms.de b,1 the trade P.eeociations and are 
compared with the liet or oompaniea• declaring their price lists and 
conditions of Bale (Article 60) and the deolarations in which the 
canpan~es give their figures tor the Statistic~l Office. 
,.,, 
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RERA:BILITAT!ON (pagea 34 to 36) 
Point 2.1 (pagea 34 and 35) summarizes the results of the auclita 
carried out by the High Authority/Camniaeion service which liaises with 
the national authorities. 
It should be remembered that ( except in Ge~) the High Authority/ 
Commission aids and quotas are calculated by computer in central daita 
processing services using programmes ~becked by the High Authority/ 
Commission services. The input is p~ovided by the employment offices. 
On-the-spot audits by the relevant Higher Authority/Commission service 
are normally carried out at the rate of twice per year and country but 
are more frequent when new aids are introduced or where rehabilitation 
i• taking place in a new coalfield. 
The audits are carried out in the preaence ot a representative of the 
Ministry of Deployment. 
It ahould be pointed out that the B79tem ie well run in, that there are 
few error• and such as there are are uB\1&117 bookkeeping error•• 
Taken overall·~ the differences which give riee ·to additional p~ent by 
the High Alrth'.ori t,1/Commisaion to the Member States are bigger than the 
sums to b·e refunded by the Member States. 
.• 
Point 2.2. (pages 35 and 36) concern• the conclusions drawn frcm the 
.. .b 
audit reports b7 the High Authori ty/Oommiasion •. 
Point 2.2~1 ~ quality and extent: 
The Court of Audi tore considers that audi ta are not : frequent enough. 
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In thia connection, the High Authority/Comm1eaion would point out that 
the object of an audit is mainly preventive and that there ia no point 
in increasing the frequency since - thanks to the programmed information 
stored on oomputcra - it is now poeaible rapidly to obtain o.n overall, 
complete and faithful picture of the actual situation. 
Storing the data on canputer haa in f'act made it possible to make a 
considerabl8 improvement in the quality of' audits at national and 
Community level. 
Although the effect or the entry ot the United JCinsdom and the oriaia 
in the iron and steel industry was to increase the sum available annuall7 
for rehabilitation from 15 million to 67 million EUA, it waa not 
considered possible to increase the adminiatrative staff or the division. 
There are in all three adminiatrative official.a dealing with all cases 
involving Article 56(2)(b) ot the resc 'l'reat7, the p~ent of' rehabilitatiC'-n 
aids and the relevant control aeasurea. 
The High Authority/Commission consider• that in this wa:, and taking account of 
the means available, the best possible position has been achieved.· 
For this reason, too, there aeema to be no reaaon t·o increase the iiumber ot 
audito or acoC1llllta. 
The Court of Auditors suggests t~t the High Authority/Commission should 
ensure that the aid policy ia etticient and effective. 
1 
I 
I ' 
.. 
Th~se aspects are not part·or the auditors• duties but, rather, part of 
the rehabilitation policy which the High Authority/Comm18oion defines in 
consultation with the Member s-t~tea, taking into account the economic and 
social cbo.ngoe in each cC1UJ1try. 
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Generally, the :range of aids ottered under Article 56(2)(b) ie sufficiently 
'llfidf~ ·to n.;;,ke .it posaibl ci to help workers aooording to their indi vidu.a.l 
neade and al,Ui tles. 
Al tht»ugh l.1i the p~·esent econ~ic climate re-employment is very diff'icul t, 
aid1J (,.i,•,).'.' :lr.; ;.;;& l'l :.' ::..·e i:b~t!ffient or temporary employment, like those which 
,n.irst h1 an e.nUncrisia division, become very important. 
Th~ t1ppHcfHl•iiJ ri.~ Asaci'e 56(2)(b) is discuaaed on various occasions 
between na;tional oiv.U servants, 1•epresentatives of the Commission and 
repreEHmta.tive.3 of both ddaa of industry, either at national (opinion 
commiti·:;;a L ;;;·~gional or even local level or in a Commun! ty institution 
(~S(; r.ommJtaa•re r.oo®:i.ttee). The aids are then adapted to requirements, in 
fi,,.' u.G it1,·U~li?J 56(2)(b) permita1~ so 
The C 001.A't of A.ud:U or u CJ proposal that '\he workers should be monitored with 
a vi.~11 ti;;-, ~um:i.:aing ihti results achieved with the rehabili ta.tion aids is 
50 OOO end 11 with the exception of those benefiting from early retirement, 
th-a .i:Uuntim1 ".Ta.Ti.ea from one worker to the next • 
..-~·..-...-.,--~ 
111a-.,-li:1S ,J,s.;)H '{i.ia:~ thla Ari.icle is no longer sufficient to a.id , orkers affected 
by the:i p:r<:'sent crisia in .iron and steel, the High Authority/Commission has 
proposed the intToduction of new measures under Article 95 of the 
ECSC Tro.tyn 
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A spot check on a number of retraining cases showed clearly that there is 
no wa;y of drawing conclusions from the situations observed., 
During their retraining period, workers may seek employment which better 
suits their abilities. Therefore their position does not develop at a 
constant pace. They are often unemployed. for certain periods, take 
vocational retraining courses - some longer than others - or pass through 
periods of re-employment when they may or may not :receive tide-over 
allowances. 
To monitor such operationa would therefore mean '1:eep:lng a constant check 
on the movements of these workers; the f:-,.ct that {;ht:,y ma.y be unemployed 
or ta.lcing a vocational retraining cou.rs'3 at f:t given moment gives no 
information about their previous or subsequent position .• 
!faking all this into account, the High Authority/Commission considers that 
following up workers undergoing retraining ~ould ~~1~re•no useful purpose, 
quite apart !ran the considerable coat inv-0lved in such an exercise. 
As indicated above, the High Author! ty/Comm.i.esfon considers tha.t tht.! 
present system of aud.i ts is satisfactory" MorfJ d,, .. tailed. a.udi ts would 
require more staff, without the controls neoessa.:ri.ly becoming more effective. 
This have been said, the present system of aud.i ts ie constantly being 
improved - the weak points in the adminis1;ration :Uld. me.nagement of aids is 
discovered and permits more suitable meauu.res to be introduced • 
. .J., 
!a the report stresses, where the conside1"able d.elaya affecti:ng some 
applications for refunds submitted by ·the official national departments to 
the High Authority/Co!ll..lDission are concerned, the latter can only take note of 
tho application3 whilst at the same tiroe regular)y insisting that the 
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Member States produce their accoun~~ more promptly. 
Member States' applications. 
audited can be determined., 
The High Authori ty/Commissiou ::J' -~: ib,3 0J:,:h1~~(' .. , "'1 '< ~ -} • • ' , ' _j -~~ 
CONCLUSIONS (pa.ge 62) 
The conclusicna on re:i<\b'iJ t·;;,,,;~j , . .i.: 
that the effectiveness and. effici<'!!n~y of 1.h~ aid policy cRJ l!'.'! i'o:r r. ['.).;!'.:.jor 
the undertakings recei vin.e: tbf; r.d.r1, 
For all these reasons, the H\~;h Au:thor:i.ty/Comcrd.ssi m.• doe::, ::w i: ~ri sh to 
as wide as possible a. ranee c·f ·1.:i.cts tn c-11.3.b]e t'·::m 1 .;ogetr.D,. ,:·Hh -i;heir 
c::nplOYJ'1c.>-:-it offj C' "S, 'to uso tho 0.i ds it' .f;:nrou.r of wor/.:er:::; : .. cco:r-d.:i.ne; to -the 
c,f tho::-c \-;or1:cr:·. 
,, ' 
'l. ..· 
.... 
TIDHNICAL .A,ND SOCIAL RESEARCH BXPENDl'rURE ( Paragraphs 40 to 47) 
The number of dossiers. in the research sector stood at 912 at the end 
of 1977. 
1. INl'ERVAL BEl'WEEN THE D~ISIONS AND THE SIGNING OF THE AGR~4E~1l'S 
Paet exper:ience confirms that an interval of six to eight months must 
elapse bet.wean the date on which the High Authority/Commission adopts 
a decision·to grant aid and the date on which a research agreement 
can be signed, ~d that this period seems virtually inevitable. 
The reason is that the decision taken by the High Authority/Commission 
al•o authorizes: 
( 1) the ~ounta required to tinanoe the research projects to be 
entered aa a provieion; 
(2) the doeai4'rs to be forwarded to the msc Consultative Committee 
tor consultation; 
(3) the decision to be forwarded to-the Council tor its approval. 
1 period. ot two to three months lliuat therefore firstly be reckoned 
with tor these consultation procedures to be completed, given the time 
required tor translation ot the documents into the six official 
' Community la~ges. 
Secondly, there is the time requireda 
(a) tor the agreement to be dratted and negotiated with the 
beneficiaries; ·...,. 
• 
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(b) for the Legal Service to give its opinion and the Financial 
Controller to approve the agreement (admittedly, since use is 
now always me.de of a standard contract drawn up in 1976, to 
which certain clauses peculiar to each contract can be adde~, 
this procedure hao been speeded up); 
(o) for the signature of the beneficiaries (of which there are often 
several) to be collected. 
In view of these - often long - time lags, and, in order to prevent 
the starting research work being subjected to delays ldlich may be 
harmful to Community industry and which would mean a corresponding 
delay in the colll!l1unication of the results of such work to the relevant 
bodies in the Coouuunity ( which is the sole objective of providing aid), 
the High Authority of the ~SC decided on 28 June 1967 (and confirmed 
its decision on 28 November 1967) that, if the beneficiary of the aid 
110 wished; the research expenditure which would be used to calculate the 
~::C a id would be that which the beneficiary would have incurred no 
earlier than on the date on which the High Authority decided, after 
eia.inining the dossiers, considered the research to be interesting and 
decided to forward the proposal for aid to the Consultative Committee and tu 
the Council for their opinions. . 
Under no circumstances is an agreement signed until the High Authority/ 
Commission gives its authorization after the consultation prooedure 
provided tor in Article 55 of the »:SC Treaty has been completed. 
'l'he appli9atio11 of the decision of 28 June 1967 and 28 November 1967 
in practice therefore sometimes means that the starting date for the 
work which is laid down in the agreements precedes the signing of the 
agreement, but this is intentional a.nd designed to provide a legal 
basis for the research expenditure which the beneficiary o~ the aid 
~·· o,.~e.. h& h'"e to meet during the period before the agreement was 
signed. 
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The High Authority/Commission wo~d also p~int out that instruc~ions 
have been given to the responsible departments to keep procedural. delays 
to a minimum, so that the requisite supplementary agreement can be drawn 
up on timo and in the correct form. Article 28 of the internal rules 
for the implementation of the operational budget of the EX:SC hence states: 
''The amounts entered as provisions for aide to research which have not 
been covered by a signed contract in the nine months following the 
decision of the High Authority/C01D.J11ission to create a provision are 
cancelled., however, the administering departments involved may, under 
the authority of the appropriate Member of the Commission, request the 
High Authority/Commission to reauthorize the creation of a provision if 
special considerations jus~ify its continuation, or·to authorize the 
oreation of a'provision for other research of an amount equal to or 
lover than the sum cancelled". 
2. INSPECTING AND CLOSING RESEARCH ACCOUNl'S 
The High Authority/Ccmmisaion is pleased to note that the Court of Auditors 
recognizes the efforts it has been making with regard to the closure 
and updating of research accounts. 
The High !uthority/Cocmaission also agrees that the inspection and closure 
ot research accounts should be carried out as quickly as possible once 
the research work has been completed. This is Idly the departments draw 
up an annual ·schedule of all research accounts to be closed in that 
financial year. This schedule is forwarded to the Court or Auditors for 
information. ' 
.Although the tina.l inspection should be carried~ as quickly as 
possible once the research work has been completed., it should be 
..... 
34 - PE 62.904/ann. 
• 
,, 
remembered that Article 5(4) ot Annex II to the research agreement. states: 
"Within twelve months of the completion of the research or of the using 
up of the financial aid granted, the &:SC, after discussing with the 
beneficiary, shall olose tha accounts and determine the exact extent 
of its contribution". 
Although the twelv~onth period may be reduce<! to six months in some 
cases it must be borne in mind that the beneficiaries need time to 
draw up tho research expenditure accounts and the final technical report. 
Finally, the Hir,h Authority/Commission must retain a certain degree of 
freedom to organize itq ini,1pection visits in a rational fashion in order 
'-·· that all interested departments can travel together and that unnecessary 
journeys can be kept to a minimum. 
3. RESIDUAL VALUE OF ESUI~NI' 
In its Communication concerning applications tor and the grant ot 
financial aids for research carried out under the m:s:: Treaty 
( OJ Bo C 139, 12 November 1974), the High Authority/Commission defined 
11.'hat ia meant by research expenditure ~o be ineluded in the amount of 
it• financial aid (Article 15). This paragraph defines, inter alia, 
such expenditure as the net research expenditure, which equals the total 
expenditure, less arzy sums lilbich may be recovered (such as discounts, 
price reductions, recovery or materials or or finished products, sale 
of equipment or facilities). 
In practice, this provision (restated in Article 7 ot Annex II ot the 
research agreements) obliges the contracting parties, once the accounts 
ha.ve been closed, to determine by joint agreement the residual value 
of the equipm(mt ldiich has been purchased or constructed on 1.he basis 
of the funds made available to the beneficiary by the ECSC to carry out 
the reEearch work. 
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It muet, however, be remembered that in most oases such equipment wa• 
purchased or constructed especially for the research work and cannot be 
regarded under any circumstances as equipment necessary for production. 
The residual value cannot therefore be calculated by means of linear 
depreciation; it muot bo regarded as the current use value to the 
person acquiring the equipment. It may therefore happen that 
' .. 
equiJII!ent which would cease to have any value if linear depreciation 
were applied is still of appreciable value if' the current use value 
method io used. Th·e reverse ia also true: equiJII!ent which is 
virtu."i.lly now ma:y in all likelihood be of' no useful value to the 
researcher and thereforo have no residual value when the accounts are 
closed. 
'l'he foregoing shows how difficult it ie to estimate the residual 
value of equi'pment at the end of research projects; this must be 
carefully assessed by both financial and technical experts. A 
depreciation rate fixed prior to the agreement can therefore only be 
applied in a very small number of cases, although the High Authority/ 
COl!Ulliesion uses thia method 'Whenever possible. 
rurthermore, it ahould be explained that jt frequently happens with 
research proj.ecta that nev equipnent has to be acquired to carry out 
certain work, even though a previous research project may have bee!l 
completocl with the same basic equipment. 
In fact, it is quite common for equipment to be changed, technical 
developcents being so rapid that new generations of machines are 
constantly becoming available. 
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4. T&:HNICAL INSPECTIONS OF THE H~1.0IBNI'ATION OF RESEARCH WORK 
As far as checks on the implementation of the reeea.rch work are concerned., 
the High Authority/Commission reaffirms that its departments always 
carry out final financial and technical inspect.ions of the reoea.rch 
work involved. These inspections are carried out jointly by the 
financial and technical administrators. At the technical level, 
oo~mitteee of international scientific experts from the field monitor 
the implementation and progress of the research work twice a year. 
These committees of experts (one for each field of research) examine 
,·,. and reach opinions on the final scientific reports. Only after these final 
.... .; 
reports have been approved does the institution make the final payment 
to the beneficiary (some 1o% of the total aid amount). This does 
sometimes mean a fairly extensive delay between the actual date of 
the inepe.otion a.nd final payment since the committees of experts 
meet only every six months. 
Accordingly since 1978 - to avoid maintaining under the •researeb•·· 
. 
provision sums lihich are insufficient, i.e. which do not cover the 
exact amount of the legal commitments - the closures have been entered 
in the accounts as soon as the inepections have been made, thus 
leaving only those amounts which still have to be paid to the · 
,,. · beneficiaries in the "research" provision. 
5. THE EXCu:DI?.U OF COST E::rr'H~TES AND Dll.AYS IN IMPLEME~"TATION' 
The High Authority/Commission does not share the Court of Auditors' 
opinion. In fact, it is not at all unusual to find that generally the 
final cost of a project turns out to be higher than the original 
estimate .or that the work takes longer to complete than originally 
expected. It should be.: .•eme:nbered that the implementation of a 
recearch project is not at all like the awarding of a public contract. 
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'l'he time required depend.a on dif'fioultiea encountered in the course of 
the work and these also atteot cost. For this reason agreements 
governing the granting of research aid place two ceilings on finanoial 
aid; one on the percentage contribution towards the expenditure 
actually incurred and one on tho .total amount of aid granted. In 
·~,. 
return, the beneficiary undertakes.to carry out the research. This 
undertaking ma.y therefore result in his having himself to meet all 
expenditure in excess of the initial estimates. 
It should not be forgotten that there will be a gap of between five and 
six years between the t.ime the beneficiary drawa up hia estimate and 
~ the completion of the work. Bearing in mind recent rates of inflation, 
it is quite possible that in some cases prices· wil.l have doubled. 
' 
6. PAYMENI'S AND PAYMENI' ON ACCOlJlft' 
In the interests ot good management, the High A.uthorit:,/Commiaaion hae 
included .ill :research agreements the lltipulatio~ that the fund.a made 
available t9 .the beneficiary by the reoo shall. be ~ep\ by him until 
they are \l.Se~ in a bank account bearing interest. 
Generally, since in almost all oases work begins before the agreement 
is signed for the reasons given above, the High Authority/Commission 
pays an advance, when the contract ia signed, equivalent to some nine 
months of work together with its contribution to the cost. of the 
equipment required before work can commence. :It subsequently modifies 
these advances according to the amount of expenditure declared by the 
beneficiary every six months and adds on estimated expenditure for 
the next six months. 
··.a,.· 
• 
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Ecoept in some special cues 11here the oanmenc~ent of work is delayed, 
the interest accruing on the payments ma.de on account to research 
institutes is generally minimal. 
To give some idea, the 130 OOO IDA in interest recorded in 1977 was 
generated by 276 research projects over a period of more than three 
years. Considering that during this same period the amounts pa.id 
to various beneficiaries amounted to more than 80 million EDA, this 
interest thus represents some 0.16". 
It may therefore be concluded that the system followed by the 
High Authority/Commission is generally good provided that care is 
taken to detect a.ny,anomalies tmich occur as soon ae possible. 
7. INSPm1'I0?1S OF' THE INS1'rrt11'I0N 
Generally, the financial aspects ot ~ research project are inspected 
once or several times during ita implementation and once upon final 
closure. These inspections are carried out jointly by the Institution's 
financial:and technical departments. Only in a few cases, where ~here is 
no need to estimate the residual value of equipm~nt or where intermediate 
inspections h~ve shown that the funds m~de available to the be~eftciary by 
the High Authority/Commission are being _properly managed, _are._~£COunts closec 
on the basis of the report and supporting documents which th~ beneficiary 
sends to the institution. From a purely technical point of view, in-
.. - . -- .. 
spections are obviously always carried out in accordance with the standard 
procedures and are scrutinized by the committees of experts referred to 
above. 
. . ..., -
• 
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BoRRo:mms (page 50) 
3, -86 . 6.1 The 7ffo stock 1971 re~ent operat!on with the referenc.e clause in 
Luxembourg francs hao so tar proved generally beneficial and also has good 
prospects tor the future. 
LOANS (page 52) 
6.2.2.1 Loans are made in accordance with the general objectives which are 
periodically defined under Article 46 of the EX:SC Treaty-. 
Under the Treaty-, Article 54 loans.are sectoral operations. 'l'he credii. 
standing of the resc - which makes possible the borrowings and therefore 
the on-lending· thereof - is founded on the levy and the guarantee fund.a. 
made up of levies and interest payments. !:ny undertaking which pa_ya the levy-
and whose investment project fits in .with the general objectives therefore is 
. . . 
entitled to obtain a loan - as long ae it afters suitable financial guarantees. 
Correspond,ence between the loans and iron and ateel policy is established. 
the moment the declaration ot investment under the thitd and fourth 
• 
subsections of Article 54 and of Decesion 22(66) of the High Authority is 
cleared; if the opinion is not favourable, the project cannot receive a 
laon; but if the opinion is favourable, the reasons are given and may lead 
to a rebate. Where no opinion is issued, this means, not that the project 
is oontrar,y to the general obj~otives, but that it calls for no special 
commen-t; ordinuy aid is then granted. 
6.2.2.5 The Pension fund was constituted in Belgian francs. At least as 
fa:r as concerns the part used tor loans to officials, it should be left in 
Belgian franc3 and expressed in EUA. i~ the balance sheet. Loa..'"lS are 
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-expressed in Belgian francs. 'l'hia avoid.a the clitterencea - 1:emporar.r 
in nature - due to fiuctuatione in the conversion rate. 
. ... ;.. 
'fRFJ..SURY (page 58) 
7 .2.2 So far these loaaea have been accepted. aa the price to be .paid 
' . 
to ensure that- msc securities. are accepted more readily on the 13elgian 
market. 
Also, the msc Treaaury baa been permitted to operate clireotl.7 on ita own 
behalf, chiefly in the repurchasing operations neceaaa.r.y in comiection 
with amortization. 
7.2.4 In a telex covering three tranatera relating to a single loan, 
the date given was that tor one ot the three orders. Nevertheleaa, the 
sum which thue arrived too early at the recipient'• bank waa able to earn 
interest. The residual loss 1• USD 6 572.70. 
7.2.5 The cash accounts were not in clebt in respect ot deduction ot 
in'terest. One was debited on 22/4 in respect or 19/4 and credited on 
'Zl/4 for -f;he 19/4. The same applies to the other, which was debited. on 
20/7 in respect ot 11/7 and credited on 1/8 tor the 11/7. 
7.2.7 These are not additional ·coats ae the mso ·ea.nis on the investments -
longer since i~ ~ subsequently - what it then~ in interest ozi th, 
advances given. 
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